The Investigatory Powers Tribunal ruled on Nov. 19 that the secret was already public, but it did not say whether the order is lawful or what it demands.
20 November 2026 • 8 min read
On Thursday, three judges in London wrote that "anyone with even a passing interest in this topic already knows that the respondent has served a technical capability notice on Apple." With that, the British government lost its claim that confirming the order would endanger the country. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal decided that it may be confirmed, in public, that the Secretary of State has given Apple a technical capability notice under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.
That is all the judgment did: it made official something the world had known for almost two years. It did not decide whether the Home Office can lawfully demand a way into encrypted iCloud data.
That question goes to a hearing in 2027.
Lady Carmichael presided over the case, [2026] UKIPTrib 9, sitting with Mr Justice Chamberlain and Mr Justice Johnson. There are two claims. Apple brought one, and Liberty and Privacy International brought the other alongside two individual claimants, Ian Hosein and Ben Wizner. The tribunal held that the government's national security assessment was "flawed in the public law sense," and that "the respondent has not established that it would be damaging to national security to reveal" that Apple received a notice. Reuters summed up the reasoning: so much information was already in the public domain that confirming the order would do little, if any, damage.
Officially, the Home Office's position had been "neither confirm nor deny", usually shortened to NCND. The judges found that its own officials had already dropped that line in practice. They pointed to extensive public reporting and to statements by US officials. They also cited media briefings they concluded had been authorized by the UK government, pointing to reports in the Times and the Financial Times that appeared to have come from "private media briefings provided by government officials".
According to the judgment, the UK government allowed Apple to brief the US Vice President and Attorney General while barring it from briefing Congress. In August 2025, US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard publicly stated that the UK had agreed to withdraw its original requirement affecting US users. Meanwhile, Dataconomy reported, Home Office witnesses said internal leak investigations found no government source for media reports about the order. The campaigners' lawyers had called the refusal to confirm "farcical" after US politicians and officials publicly referred to the original order and unidentified UK government sources confirmed it.
Liberty says the ruling is the first known instance of officials being compelled to acknowledge such a notice. Its director, Akiko Hart, called it "a victory for transparency."
Very little about the order itself came out.
MacAnorak, summarising Reuters, noted that the tribunal hasn't ruled that the underlying order was unlawful or decided whether the UK government can legitimately require Apple to make changes to its encryption systems. Nor has it disclosed the precise technical requirements of the notice. The judges also accepted part of the government's case. In the judgment's words, "We agree that it would be damaging to national security if all of the material (including the content of the technical capability evidence, and the evidence of Apple and the respondent) were publicly disclosed." Two further judgments, one private and one closed, were handed down the same day and will not be published. PPC Land explains the difference: the NGOs are excluded from a private session, while both the NGOs and Apple are excluded from a closed one. According to MLex, the tribunal deferred its decision about whether any details of the order can be made public.
In its statement, the government said almost nothing new. "Apple has been helping the police and intelligence agencies pursue criminals and bring them to justice for several years, in accordance with the law," a government spokesperson said. "This technical capability notice simply requires that they maintain the ability to do so." The word "maintain" comes from Section 253, which lets the Home Secretary require an operator to maintain capabilities that help authorities act on warrants, provided the demand is proportionate and a Judicial Commissioner approves it.
According to Reuters, in January last year Britain issued an initial notice for a back door to allow it access to encrypted cloud backups of data of US and British citizens. The Washington Post first exposed the order on February 7, 2025, and reported that it targeted Advanced Data Protection (ADP), an opt-in setting which largely protects users' iCloud data with end-to-end encryption. Apple then stopped offering ADP to new UK users. Existing users were given time to turn it off themselves to keep using iCloud, while iMessage and FaceTime remain end-to-end encrypted. Reuters reports that the first demand was dropped following months of negotiations with US President Donald Trump's administration, but in July Britain issued a second notice that applied just to Apple's UK customers.
Outlets give different dates for that second notice, and the open judgment does not settle it. PPC Land points out that it does not say what the notice requires Apple to do or which Apple products or services it concerns. It also leaves open whether the order reported by the Financial Times as issued in September 2025 is the notice now under challenge.
Where the ruling matters most is in how the next stage will be heard. Much of the case can now be heard in public, though the content of the notice will remain secret for the time being, to be decided on at a later date. Apple has five grounds of challenge, and PPC Land reports that most of them can now be argued in open court. Liberty's and Privacy International's case challenging the TCN regime continues, with a final hearing expected in 2027. Technology.org reports that Apple's challenge to the notice's lawfulness goes to trial in the first half of 2027.
That hearing will decide whether a British minister can secretly order a global company to change how its encryption works. Liberty, citing the consumer group Which?, puts the number of iCloud users in the UK at approximately 39 to 40 million. Apple told TechCrunch that it welcomes the decision to make public the fact that the U.K. Home Office issued a technical capability notice, and it has said before that it has "never built a backdoor or master key" to any of its products or services and "never will." Silkie Carlo of Big Brother Watch called on the government to withdraw the notice.
Nothing in the judgment establishes that UK authorities have unrestricted access to Apple accounts or that customer data has already been accessed under the notice. It confirms only that a technical capability notice was given to Apple.
Under Apple's standard iCloud settings, Apple holds the keys to much of your backed-up data, and anything a provider can read, a government can try to compel it to hand over. If you are in the UK and never turned on ADP, you can no longer get it. Wallet seed phrases and recovery codes should not sit in any cloud backup in readable form, and neither should sensitive business files. Keep them offline, or encrypt them yourself with a key the provider never sees before you upload them.
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